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I. INTRODUCTION
Anyone who has spent time in cyberspace understands the concept of an alter
ego. In online games, chat rooms and on the internet generally, users select one or
more avatars to represent themselves. Avatars function as the end-user’s alter ego.
The avatar may be a three-dimensional character in a multiplayer game or a twodimensional icon on a bulletin board. This article uses the concept of avatars to
explain the tax treatment of real-life alter egos: agents under a power of attorney.
Specifically, the article discusses (1) how traditional, standard legal instruments
can be used to create legal alter egos; (2) how and why these legal avatars receive
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favorable transfer tax treatment; (3) how uniform laws are changing to protect
legal avatars; (4) whether new legislation will increase or decrease the use of legal
avatars; and (5) how scholars might use the tax treatment of legal avatars to
advocate for the favorable tax treatment of relationships that arise by choice.
Part I of this article is an introduction. Part II provides an overview of how
powers of attorney create legal alter egos. At its core, executing a power of
attorney is like selecting an online avatar. It is a choice to make someone (or
something) our representative in the real (or cyber) world. A power of attorney
enables one person (called the attorney-in-fact or the agent)1 to act on behalf of
another (the principal). Part III of this article describes the favorable tax treatment
that agents—legal alter egos or avatars—receive and seeks to reconcile this
preferred treatment with the inconsistent approach of the Internal Revenue Service
(the “Service”) to fiduciary duty. Part IV explores the major reforms of the
Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act of 2006 (the "2006 Act")2 and Part V
anticipates its consequences. Standardizing the principal/agent relationship may
have economic consequences that the drafters of the 2006 Act have not anticipated.
Part VI of this article considers the implications of the tax treatment of legal
avatars. By both inverting a critical paradigm and drawing on the model of a
cyberspace avatar, powers of attorney are revealed as a vehicle for choice-based
representation. Those who would like the law to recognize varied configurations of
choice-based human relationships may find the tax treatment of legal avatars to be
a helpful model for their efforts.
II. CREATING A LEGAL AVATAR: THE POWER OF ATTORNEY
A. Creation
A power of attorney is a legal instrument whereby one person, typically called
the principal, designates one or more other persons, typically called the
attorney(s)-in-fact or the agent(s), to act on his or her behalf.3 Every jurisdiction in
the United States recognizes some form of the power of attorney.4 Depending on

* © 2008 Bridget Crawford.
1
To avoid confusion between the terms “attorney-at-law” and “attorney-in-fact,” this
Article follows the choice of the drafters of the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act to
refer to the person appointed by the principal under a power of attorney as the “agent.” See
UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 102(1) (amended 2006), 8B U.L.A. 24 (Supp. 2008).
2
Id.
3
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1191 (7th ed. 1999).
4
See, e.g., Karen E. Boxx, The Durable Power of Attorney’s Place in the Family of
Fiduciary Relationships, 36 GA. L. REV. 1, 12 (2001).
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the jurisdiction, a principal's delegation of authority to an agent may or may not
require a formal writing.5 In those jurisdictions that require a formal writing,
counselors to even the wealthiest Americans typically use standard pre-printed
forms of powers of attorney because these are most likely to be recognized and
accepted by banks and financial institutions.6
B. Scope
Powers of attorney generally fall into two categories: those that are presently
exercisable7 and those that are “springing,” or effective only upon the occurrence
of a certain event such as the principal's incapacity. Within each classification the
power may be time limited or unlimited in duration (“durable”). The powers
granted may be broad or narrow in scope.
Lawyers frequently counsel their clients who are in long-term marriages to
execute presently exercisable durable powers of attorney granting each other broad
powers to act as agent.8 Such a power allows either spouse to act on the other’s
behalf, whether as a matter of convenience or necessity. Similarly a parent who has
a close emotional and geographic relationship with an adult child may execute a
general durable power of attorney in favor of the adult child.
There may be several reasons that a lawyer might counsel a client to execute a
springing power instead of a general durable power. A client might view the
execution of a power of attorney as diminishing his or her control, or the client
may distrust family members or close friends. This client may want to postpone
delegating his or her authority until it is absolutely necessary. Similarly a client
may wish to designate authority to an individual for a particular transaction only.
Consider the following hypothetical:

5

See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-5 (1998) (explaining that in order to use the
delegated powers in conveying land the conveyance “shall be . . . [i]n writing”). The
applicable South Carolina statute, S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-501(C) (1986), requires that a
durable power of attorney that includes the power to convey real estate must be executed
with all of the same formalities required for the valid execution of a Will.
6
E-mail from James S. Sligar, Esq., Partner, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy
LLP, to Bridget J. Crawford, Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law
(Aug. 10, 2007, 1:27 PM EST) (on file with author).
7
See, e.g., 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 26 (2002) (describing the function of a presently
exercising durable power of attorney); LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & MELISSA C. BROWN,
ADVISING THE ELDERLY OR DISABLED CLIENT ¶ 21.03[1] (2d ed. 2003), available at 2001
WL 642769 (2008) (providing an overview of the legal issues related to the durable power
of attorney).
8
See, e.g., 45 SHARON RIVENSON MARK, N.J. PRAC. SERIES Elder Law—
Guardianships & Conservatorships § 1.4 (2d. ed. 2007).
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Hypothetical 1. A is scheduled to close on her purchase of a new
home, Redacre, on December 1, 2007. Unfortunately, A will be traveling
out of town then and the seller is not willing to reschedule. A has several
adult children whom she trusts completely, but none of them lives close
enough to attend the closing of Redacre on December 1, 2007. On
November 30, 2007, A executes a springing power of attorney, effective
only on December 1, 2007, and with respect to the purchase of Redacre,
in favor of her friend B.
Hypothetical 1 presents a classic case in which a springing, limited (or
narrow) power of appointment is appropriate. A has several adult children on
whom she can rely as a general matter, but these children are not able to be present
for the closing of Redacre. For convenience, A grants B the authority to sign and
execute all documents relating to the purchase of Redacre that A herself could and
would sign if she were physically present. Because the power is time limited, it is
not necessary for A to revoke the power when she returns from her trip; it expires
automatically after December 1, 2007.
C. Limitations
Two issues dominate any discussion of powers of attorney. First, not everyone
has one. Second, those who do have powers of attorney may not understand them.
Powers of attorney are only useful if they exist. Someone who has no close family
members or friends may never execute a power of attorney. Furthermore, because
the typically granted powers are broad, it is likely that a principal agent or a third
party could misunderstand or misinterpret the full extent of the agent’s authority.
Some agents may even abuse their powers to enrich themselves at the expense of
the principal.9 Historically this toxic combination of uncertainty and power has led
banks and other financial institutions to be reluctant to accept powers of attorney.10
For example, some institutions decline to accept powers because they were
executed in another jurisdiction or several years prior to presentment.11 The
9

See David M. English & Kimberly K. Wolff, Survey Results: Use of Durable
Powers, PROB. & PROP., Jan./Feb. 1996, at 33, 33–35.
10
See WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. & SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS AND
ESTATES, INCLUDING TAXATION AND FUTURE INTERESTS 351 (3d ed. 2004).
11
Id. Some states, such as New York, have adopted penalties for institutions that
refuse to accept a power of attorney executed in keeping with statutory formalities. See
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1504(3) (McKinney 2001) (“The failure of a financial
institution to honor a properly executed statutory short form power of attorney shall be
deemed unlawful.”).
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National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws cites the “problem
of arbitrary refusals of powers of attorney by banks, brokerage houses, and
insurance companies” as one of the primary reasons that the laws need to be
reformed.12 Validly executed powers have no practical use if banks and other
institutions will not accept them.
III. TAXING LEGAL AVATARS
A. Estate and Gift Tax Generally
1. Overview of Gift Taxation
Current law imposes a tax on completed transfers of property by gift that
otherwise are not excludible from the definition of “gift” or in some way eligible
for an exemption from the gift tax.13 This seemingly simple rule derives from
several sections of the Internal Revenue Code and the related Treasury
Regulations.14 As an initial matter I.R.C. § 2501 imposes a gift tax on the transfer
of property by gift by an individual.15 To illustrate, consider a second hypothetical:
Hypothetical 2. X physically transfers to Y a famous painting
owned by X. X also transfers legal title to Y. X receives nothing in
return. X and Y are not related in any way.
In Hypothetical 2, X has made a transfer of property to Y for gift tax
purposes because she transfers the title (and possession of) the painting to Y.
Contrast that with another scenario:
Hypothetical 3. X invites Y to X’s home to view a famous painting
owned by X.
In Hypothetical 3, X does not make a transfer of property for gift tax purposes
because X does not divest herself of ownership or control over the painting. The
painting presumably hangs in X’s home while X and Y gaze at it and the painting
remains in X’s home thereafter. Furthermore X does not make a transfer of
property for gift tax purposes when Y comes to view the painting. X may bestow
12

Uniform Law Commissioners: The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, Summary: Uniform Power of Attorney Act (2006), http://www.nccusl
.org/Update/uniformact_summaries/uniformacts-s-upoaa.asp (last visited Sept. 30, 2008)
[hereinafter Uniform Power of Attorney Act Summary].
13
See I.R.C. §§ 2501–2505 (2006).
14
Unless otherwise specified all references to the Internal Revenue Code [hereinafter
the “Code” or “I.R.C.”] refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
15
Id. § 2501(a).
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on Y some psychic or emotional pleasure in inviting Y to view the painting, but
such hedonic enjoyment is not property for gift tax purposes.
If Hypotheticals 2 and 3 suggest that one can determine with relative ease
what is (and is not) a transfer of property for gift tax purposes, it is moderately
more difficult to determine what constitutes a transfer of property by gift for gift
tax purposes. I.R.C. § 2502 provides that the amount of gift tax imposed on a
transfer of property by gift is the excess of the tentative tax imposed on “the
aggregate sum of the taxable gifts for the taxable year and for each of the
preceding calendar periods” over the tentative tax on “the aggregate sum of the
taxable gifts for each of the preceding calendar periods.”16 To illustrate, consider
the following hypothetical:
Hypothetical 4. Prior to 2006 X never made a taxable gift. In 2006,
X makes $1,000,000 in taxable gifts. X applies to these transfers the
credit under I.R.C. § 2505, so X owes no gift tax with respect to this
$1,000,000 of gifts. In 2007 X transfers $50,000 to Y. X makes no other
taxable transfers.
To calculate the gift tax owed with respect to X’s transfers in 2007, one first
computes the tentative tax imposed with respect to X’s gifts in 2006. One then
subtracts this amount, or $345,800, from $366,300, which is the tentative tax on
the aggregate sum of X’s gifts in 2007 and 2006 ($1,000,000 plus $50,000, or
$1,050,000).17 Therefore, with respect to the transfer in 2007, X owes $366,300
minus $346,800 in gift tax, or $20,500.
Note that the calculation of gift tax hinges in large part on the definition of
“taxable gifts.”18 But the Code does not define the term “gift.” The closest one
comes is in the valuation rule of I.R.C. § 2512.19 That section provides that where a
gift is made in property, its value at the date of the gift is the amount of the gift.20
In the case of a transfer for partial consideration, the amount of the gift will be the
amount by which the value of property transferred exceeds the value of property
received.21 In common parlance then, a gift occurs when one transfers more than
16

Id. § 2502(a). This rule has the effect of making each gift incrementally more
“expensive” in a tax sense. See Id. § 2502(a)(1) (computation of tax); id. § 2502(a)(2) (rate
schedule).
17
Id. §§ 2502(a), 2001(c)(1) (rate schedule). The tentative tax on $1,050,000 is
$345,800 plus 41% of the excess of such amount over $1,000,000 (or 41% of 50,000),
$366,300.
18
Id. §§ 2501–2502.
19
See id. § 2512(a).
20
Id.
21
Id. § 2512(b).
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one receives in return, or when—and to the extent that—one “gives” more than
one “gets.” To illustrate, consider this variation on Hypothetical 2.
Hypothetical 5. X transfers to Y title to the famous painting owned
by X. The painting has a fair market value of $5,000.22 Y pays X only
$4,000 cash.
In this case X makes a taxable gift to Y of $1,000, or the amount by which the
fair market value of the painting ($5,000) exceeds the consideration received
($4,000).23 Note that the determination of whether the transfer is a “gift” for gift
tax purposes depends on a comparison of values—whether X “gave” more than X
“got,” not whether X intended to make a gift to Y.24
Apart from a difference between the value of what a taxpayer transfers and
the value the taxpayer receives in return, for a transfer to be subject to gift taxation,
the transfer must be complete. Completion occurs when “the donor has so parted
with dominion and control as to leave in him no power to change its disposition,
whether for his own benefit or for the benefit of another."25 The following
hypothetical presents a typical case of an incomplete gift.
Hypothetical 6. X transfers title to the painting to Y (whether for no
consideration or for less than fair market value), 26 subject at all times to
X’s right to take the painting back (and the requirement that X then
refund Y’s money).
Because X retains the right to revoke the transfer, it is not complete for gift
tax purposes, and no gift tax will be imposed.27 Similarly, if X loans Y a car so that
Y can go to the grocery store, then X has transferred to Y the value of the use of
the car for a specific period of time,28 but X has not make a completed transfer of
22

See id. § 2512(a).
Assuming that Y is an individual, not a charity, the income tax consequences of this
transaction are governed by Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1001-1(e), 1.1015-4 (as amended in 1996).
The transferor’s gain is the excess of amount realized over adjusted basis, provided that no
loss can be recognized in a part sale/part gift transaction. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(e) (as
amended in 1996).
24
This definition for gift tax purposes contrasts to the definition of a gift for income
tax purposes. The income tax definition depends in large part on the transferor’s intent.
See, e.g., Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 286 (1960).
25
Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (as amended in 1999); see also Rev. Rul. 69-347, 19691 C.B. 227 (explaining that a gift pursuant to a prenuptial agreement is complete as of date
of the parties’ marriage).
26
See I.R.C. § 2512(a).
27
Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b).
28
See, e.g., Dickman v. Comm’r, 465 U.S. 330, 338 (1984) (noting that an interest23
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the entire car to Y. X cedes some amount of dominion and control over the car for
the period that Y drove the car to the grocery store, but X does not make an
irrevocable transfer of the car itself.
There are four major exceptions to the imposition of gift taxes under Chapter
12 of the Code. First, as illustrated in Hypothetical 4, under I.R.C. § 2505, with
respect to gifts made after December 31, 2001, each citizen or resident of the
United States has a credit against the gift tax equal to the amount needed to
“shelter” the first $1,000,000 in taxable transfers from taxation.29 Second, a
taxpayer may exclude from the calculation of his or her taxable gifts those
transfers that qualify for the annual exclusion under I.R.C. § 2503(b).30 Third, the
taxpayer may exclude from the calculation of taxable gifts any payments on behalf
of any person made directly to an educational institution as tuition, or directly to a
medical care provider for any person’s medical expenses.31 Fourth, a taxpayer may
subtract from the amount of his or her taxable gifts the deductions permitted by
Subchapter C of Chapter 12 of the Code.32 Those deductions include transfers to
or for the use of charity and transfers to a spouse.33
2. The Special Case of Transfers Subject to Withdrawal Rights
A transfer subject to gift tax may be direct or indirect. For example, in some
contexts the right to withdraw property is the equivalent of an outright transfer for
gift tax purposes. Consider this variation on Hypothetical 2:
Hypothetical 7. X wants to give a painting to Y, but X is not able to
attend to the details of the transfer before X leaves on a long vacation.
Without receiving any consideration from Y, X places the painting in a
secure local storage facility. X also places in the storage facility a
binding legal instrument transferring the painting to Y. X hands Y the
key to the storage facility so that Y may pick up the painting at Y’s
convenience.
free loan between parents and son is a taxable gift of the “rental value” of use of the
money, i.e., the foregone interest).
29
See I.R.C. § 2505(a)(1).
30
Under I.R.C. § 2503(a), “taxable gifts” are “the total amount of gifts made during
the calendar year,” other than certain transfers such as annual exclusion gifts made
pursuant to I.R.C. § 2503(b), less the deductions permitted by subchapter C of Chapter 12
of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C. §§ 2522–2524).
31
Id. § 2503(e).
32
Id. § 2503(b). Subchapter C is found at I.R.C. §§ 2522–2524.
33
Id. § 2522 (charity); id. § 2523(a) (spouse). The recipient must be the donor's
spouse at the time of the gift. Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(a)-1(a) (as amended in 1995).
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Unlike the facts of Hypothetical 2, in Hypothetical 7, X does not physically
transfer the painting to Y. She places it in a storage facility and gives Y the key.
Therefore Y can take possession of the painting at any time. Under the case of
Crummey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the transfers in Hypotheticals 2
and Hypothetical 7 are treated the same for gift tax purposes.34 Y’s rights with
respect to the painting in the storage facility are sufficient to cause X to be treated
for gift tax purposes as if she had transferred the painting directly to Y.
In the estate planning context, taxpayers frequently use the rule of Crummey
to make tax-free transfers in trust for the benefit of family members or others.35 In
the typical “Crummey” trust, named after the taxpayer in whose case the court
validated the technique, one or more beneficiaries with a present interest in the
trust have the right to withdraw a pro rata share of property transferred to the
trust.36 As in Hypothetical 7, where Y’s ability to take possession of the painting in
storage is treated for gift tax purposes the same as if X physically had transferred
the painting to Y, a taxpayer’s contribution to a Crummey trust is treated for gift
tax purposes like an outright transfer to a beneficiary, as long as the beneficiary
has certain withdrawal rights.37 Because such a transfer is treated as a present
interest,38 the property subject to that withdrawal right qualifies for the gift tax
annual exclusion under I.R.C. § 2503.39
If drafted properly, a beneficiary’s withdrawal rights may qualify transfers to
a trust for the gift tax annual exclusion, but these rights can have other unintended
tax consequences. Generally speaking, a beneficiary’s withdrawal right is treated
as a general power of appointment.40 In other words, in Hypothetical 7, for estate
tax purposes, Y’s unrestricted right to take the painting out of storage is treated the
same as actual ownership by Y. Therefore under I.R.C. § 2041, the property
subject to a beneficiary’s withdrawal right will be included in his or her gross
estate for federal estate tax purposes.41 Similarly, to the extent that a beneficiary’s
34

397 F.2d 82, 88 (9th Cir. 1968).
For more information on Crummey trusts, see JONATHAN G. BLATTMACHR, THE
COMPLETE GUIDE TO WEALTH PRESERVATION AND ESTATE PLANNING 406–09 (1999).
36
Crummey, 397 F.2d 82, 87–88.
37
Cristofani v. Comm’r, 97 T.C. 74, 79–84 (1991), acq. in result, 1992-1 CB 1,
action on dec., 1992-09 (Mar. 23, 1992). In an Action on Decision, the Service announced
that it “[would] deny exclusions for powers held by individuals who either have no
property interests in the trust except for Crummey powers, or hold only contingent
remainder interests.”Id.
38
Gifts of future interests do not qualify for the gift tax annual exclusion. I.R.C.
§ 2503(b)(1) (2006).
39
Id. § 2503.
40
RICHARD B, STEPHENS ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION ¶ 9.04[3][f]
n.118 (8th ed. 2002).
41
I.R.C. § 2041.
35
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power lapses, that lapse is considered a release of the power under I.R.C.
§ 2514(e),42 to the extent that the property subject to the power exceeds the greater
of $5,000 or 5% of the aggregate trust property subject to the power.43 The release
of a power may cause the beneficiary to be deemed to have made a gift to the trust
in the amount subject to the power of withdrawal.44 Similar rules, discussed in the
next section, apply for estate tax purposes.
3. Overview of Estate Taxation
Estate tax is imposed on the transfer of a decedent’s “taxable estate.”45 I.R.C.
§ 2051 defines the taxable estate as the decedent’s “gross estate” minus certain
deductions.46 The gross estate is the value of all of the decedent's property, “real or
personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated.”47 This section highlights three
specific rules regarding estate tax inclusion.
First, the value of property in which the decedent had an interest is explicitly
included in the decedent’s gross estate.48 Therefore in Hypothetical 3, where X
invites Y to X’s home to view a famous painting owned by X, if X dies during the
viewing, for example, the value of the painting will be included in X’s gross
estate.49 This is because X is the owner of the painting at the time of her death. X
did not transfer any interest in the painting by inviting Y to view it. 50
Second, property subject to the decedent’s power to “alter, amend, revoke, or
terminate” is included in a decedent’s gross estate.51 Therefore, in Hypothetical 6,
where X transfers title to the painting to Y, subject to X’s right to revoke the
transfer, this right of revocation causes the value of the painting to be includible in
X’s gross estate.52
Third, a decedent’s gross estate includes property subject to any general
power of appointment held by the decedent.53 Under I.R.C. § 2041(a), a general
power of appointment is one that the power holder may exercise in favor of
himself or herself, the power holder’s estate, the power holder’s creditors, or the
42

Id. § 2514(e).
Id.
44
See Crummey, 397 F.2d 82, 87-88; Rev. Rul. 85-88, 1985-2 C.B. 201.
45
I.R.C. § 2001(a).
46
Id. § 2051.
47
Id. § 2031(a).
48
Id. § 2033.
49
Id.
50
See supra Part III.A.1.
51
I.R.C. § 2038(a)(1).
52
Id.
53
Id. § 2041(a)(2).
43
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creditors of the power holder’s estate, subject to certain limitations.54 For estate tax
purposes, it is irrelevant whether the decedent or another person creates the power
of appointment. What matters is whether the decedent has the ability to direct the
disposition of the appointive property so as to cause it to be treated for estate tax
purposes as if it were owned outright by the decedent. Consider the following
example.
Hypothetical 8. X creates a trust for Y. The trust instrument
provides in pertinent part that:
The Trustee shall manage, invest and reinvest the trust property,
collect the income therefrom, and pay over or apply the net income and
principal thereof, to such extent, including the whole thereof, and in such
manner or manners and at such time or times, as the Trustee, in the
exercise of sole and absolute discretion, may deem advisable, to or for
the benefit of Y. Any net income not so paid over or applied shall be
accumulated and added to principal at least annually and thereafter shall
be held, administered and disposed of as a part thereof. Upon the death
of Y, the principal of the trust estate, and any net income then remaining
in the hands of the Trustee, shall be transferred, conveyed and paid over
to such person or persons (including Y, Y’s estate, the creditors of Y or
creditors of Y’s estate), or corporation or corporations to such extent, in
such amounts or proportions, and in such lawful interests or estates,
whether absolute or in trust, as Y may appoint by last will and testament.
In Hypothetical 8, Y has a testamentary power of appointment insofar as Y
may appoint the trust property in his or her Will.55 Y’s power is a general power
because Y may appoint the trust property to anyone, including Y, Y’s estate, Y’s
creditors or the creditors of Y’s estate. For estate tax purposes Y is treated as if Y
owned the property outright.56
I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1) contains several exceptions to the definition of a power of
appointment.57 Under that section a power is not a general power of appointment if
it is exercisable only in conjunction with the creator of the power or a person
having a “substantial interest in the property . . . which is adverse to exercise of the
power in favor of the decedent. . . ."58 Although the definition of a "substantial”
interest is somewhat vague—one that has a “value in relation to the total value of

54

See id. § 2041(b)(1)(A), (C).
See id. § 2041(b)(1)(A).
56
See id. § 2041(a)(3).
57
Id. § 2041(b)(1).
58
Id. § 2041(b)(1) (C)(iii).
55
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the property subject to the power [that] is not insignificant”59—the meaning of
“adverse” is clear. Examples of adverse interest holders include a taker in default
of the exercise of a power and a co-holder of a power where the co-holder may
appoint the trust property after the decedent’s death in favor of the co-holder, the
co-holder’s estate, the co-holder’s creditors, or the creditors of the co-holder’s
estate.60 The gift tax rules are similar.61
After totaling all of the amounts that are included in a decedent's gross estate,
to determine the value of the taxable estate, one must deduct all of the permitted
items.62 The most common deductions from the taxable estate include the value of
property passing from a decedent to his or her surviving spouse63 and contributions
to or for the use of public, charitable and religious organizations.64
B. Why a Power of Attorney Does Not Give Rise to Wealth Transfer Taxation
If gift tax is imposed on completed transfers by gift,65 and estate tax is
imposed on the value of a decedent’s gross estate,66 one must query whether the
execution of a power of attorney could give rise to a taxable gift or cause property
subject to the power to be included in the agent’s gross estate. If X creates a
presently exercisable general durable power of attorney in favor of Y, has X made
a taxable transfer to Y? If the transfer of property subject to a power holder’s right
to withdraw is treated the same for gift tax purposes as an outright transfer of
property, then why does the principal not make a taxable gift to the agent upon
execution of the power of attorney?
On the question of whether a power of attorney gives rise to a transfer, it
would appear that the answer is no. After X executes a power of attorney, X is still
the sole legal owner of her bank accounts, real estate and other property. As a
technical matter, it is true that under the power of attorney Y has the legal ability to
sell, exchange, consume or otherwise dispose of the property subject to the power.
But Y as agent merely has certain authorities over that property. X has not
transferred any property to Y.

59

Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(c)(2) (as amended in 1997).
Id.
61
See id. § 25.2514-3(b)(1), (2).
62
See I.R.C. §§ 2051–2057.
63
Id. § 2056(a) (noting that this amount may be deducted to the extent that such
interest is included in the value of the gross estate).
64
Id. § 2055(a)(1)-(4).
65
Id. § 2001(a).
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See supra Part III.A.3.
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Consider, however, the complex situation that can arise when under
applicable state law or the express terms of the power of attorney itself, the agent
has the ability to appoint the principal’s property to the agent himself, his creditors,
the agent’s estate or the creditors of the agent’s estate. This would seem to be the
precise type of power over property that the gift and estate tax rules should make
subject to the wealth transfer tax. On the one hand it could be argued that a
mentally competent principal’s ability to revoke the power of attorney should
prevent the mere execution of a power of appointment from being treated as a
completed transfer. Therefore the execution of the power would not give rise to a
gift tax. If, however, the agent has the power to appoint the trust property by
making gifts to himself, for example, then once the agent has done so, it would
appear that the transfer to the agent (by the agent himself) becomes complete.
Assuming the principal has no right to reverse a transfer if made within the scope
of the agent’s authority, then the principal's right of revocation alone does not
prevent a taxable transfer in this case.
If a principal’s ability to revoke the power, standing alone, may not be
sufficient to prevent the imposition of a transfer tax on the creation of a power of
appointment,67 then two further intertwined explanations should round out the
analysis. First, the agent is limited by his or her fiduciary duties to the principal to
expend the property subject to the power only for the benefit of the principal.68 For
example, when X grants Y a presently exercisable general durable power of
appointment with respect to X’s bank account containing $1,000,000, then Y has
the ability to withdraw the $1,000,000 from the account, but only for the benefit of
X or if consistent with X’s intent. Y may not go out and buy himself a bright red
Ferrari, for example, without a specific indication that X intends Y to have that
ability. Additionally an agent must “obey all reasonable instructions and directions
from the principal regarding the manner of performing his or her services under the
power of attorney.”69 At least one commentator has speculated that an agent’s
fiduciary duty could be construed to include the requirement to seek the principal’s
advance consent before exercising any power.70 If this were true, then an agent
under a power of attorney resembles a holder of a power of appointment who may
not exercise his or her authority without the consent of another person. Under
I.R.C. §§ 2041(b)(1)(C) and 2514(c)(3) an attorney-in-fact would fall explicitly
outside the definition of a power of appointment.71 Therefore, if one construes an
agent’s duties to require at least the implicit consent of the principal, if not her
67

Peter B. Tiernan, Power of Attorney Can Inadvertently Swell Agent’s Taxable
Estate, 72 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 4, 5 (2004).
68
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 13 cmt. a (1933).
69
Tiernan, supra note 67, at 6; see also 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 218 (2002)
(explaining that the agent has a duty of reasonable care with regards to safekeeping the
principal’s property).
70
Tiernan, supra note 67, at 6.
71
See I.R.C. §§ 2041(b)(1)(C), 2514(c)(3).
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explicit consent, then the agent should not possess a power of appointment that
would cause the property subject to the power to be subject to any wealth transfer
taxes.
Construing an agent’s authorities under a power of attorney to require the
principal’s implied or express consent interprets fiduciary duty in a tax-sensitive
way. The Service,however, has not been consistently receptive to the argument that
fiduciary duty functions as a meaningful limitation for wealth-transfer tax
purposes. In several important cases, the Service has rejected fiduciary duty as
either ineffective or illusory.
C. The Impact of Fiduciary Duty in Other Transfer Tax Contexts
The argument that fiduciary duty, however construed, limits an agent’s
actions under a power of attorney is particularly curious in light of the Service’s
position that fiduciary duty is not a meaningful constraint in some other gift and
estate tax contexts. This section describes the development of the Service’s
position that fiduciary duty can be ignored for wealth-transfer tax purposes and
suggests why that position should not apply to contracts for intimacy in the form of
powers of attorney.
1. Background
In United States v. Byrum, the taxpayer transferred his stock in three closely
held corporations to an irrevocable trust for the benefit of his descendants with a
third-party bank acting as corporate trustee.72 The corporate trustee had broad
control over the trust property except that Mr. Byrum retained the right to vote any
non-publicly traded shares held by the trust, to veto the sale, transfer, investment or
reinvestment of trust assets and to remove the corporate trustee and appoint a
successor trustee in its place.73 Upon Mr. Byrum’s death the Service sought to
include in his gross estate under I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2) the value of the stock
transferred to the trust.74 The Service reasoned that the decedent retained the right
to designate the beneficial enjoyment of the property.75 The court rejected this
argument, however, finding that whatever powers Mr. Byrum retained, they were
not granted to him under the trust instrument itself.76 Rather, to the extent that Mr.
Byrum had any powers with respect to distributions of corporate income, they
72

408 U.S. 125, 126 (1972), reh’g denied, 409 U.S. 898 (1972).
Id. at 126-27.
74
Id. at 131-32.
75
Id. at 132.
76
Id. at 132-33.
73
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arose out of his position as a majority shareholder (because, as such, he could
control the Board of Directors).77 According to the court, Mr. Byrum was bound by
his fiduciary duty as a majority shareholder “not to misuse his power by promoting
his personal interests at the expense of corporate interests.”78 Furthermore, the
court noted that the Directors themselves had “a fiduciary duty to promote the
interests of the corporation. However great Byrum’s influence may have been with
the corporate directors, their legal responsibilities were to all stockholders.”79
Therefore for estate tax purposes, two levels of fiduciary constraints effectively
limited Mr. Byrum’s control over the transferred property.
In deciding Byrum, the court cited several cases in support of its holding. Two
of these cases provide particular insight into the court’s construction of the
limitations that fiduciary duty imposes on the exercise of any rights a taxpayer may
retain. For example, the Byrum court cited Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co.80 for the
proposition that “a settlor’s retention of broad powers of management does not
necessarily subject an inter vivos trust to the federal estate tax.”81 In Reinecke, the
representative of the decedent’s estate brought suit for recovery of estate tax paid
with respect to certain trusts, created by the decedent during his lifetime.82 In the
case of five of those trusts, the decedent retained the right to “supervise the
reinvestment of trust funds, to require the trustee to execute proxies, to his
nominee, to vote any shares of stock held by the trustee, to control all leases
executed by the trustee, and to appoint successor trustees.”83 The Reinecke court
held that these powers were not sufficient to cause estate tax inclusion of the assets
of any of the five trusts, reasoning that in no way had “the reserved powers of
management of the trusts saved to [the] decedent any control over the economic
benefits or enjoyment of the property.”84
In Estate of King v. Commissioner,85 also cited by the Byrum court, the
decedent created three trusts, one for each of his three children.86 Each child had
the right to receive income from his or her respective trust; upon the death of the
child, the trust principal was to be paid out to the children’s children.87 The
decedent as grantor expressly prohibited the trustee from making any management
or investment decisions except as directed by the grantor himself.88 The Service
77

Id. at 136-37.
Id. at 137.
79
Id. at 138.
80
278 U.S. 339 (1929).
81
Byrum, 408 U.S. at 133.
82
See Reinecke, 278 U.S. 339, 343–344.
83
Id. at 344.
84
Id. at 346.
85
Estate of King v. Comm’r, 37 T.C. 973 (1962).
86
See id. at 974.
87
Id. at 974.
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Id. at 975–76.
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argued that the decedent’s retained right to direct the trustee with respect to
management and investment of trust assets caused the inclusion of the trust
property in the grantor's gross estate under I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2).89 The estate
countered that the decedent’s powers were “exercisable only in a fiduciary
capacity, subject to the scrutiny of a court of equity; that . . . the grantor was under
a duty to act impartially as between successive beneficiaries; [and] that, therefore,
he did not retain any right to designate the persons who should possess or enjoy the
property or the income therefrom.”90 Finding in favor of the taxpayer, the tax court
stated that the grantor’s retained power had the legal effect of making the grantor a
trustee, but in doing so “he had subjected himself to those obligations of fidelity
and diligence that attach to the office of trustee. . . . His discretion, however broad,
did not relieve him from obedience to the great principles of equity which are the
life of every trust.”91 Therefore, for estate tax purposes, the fiduciary obligations
imposed on a trustee acted as effective constraints on the rights retained by the
grantor.
In the years following Byrum, courts continued to find that fiduciary duty
operated as a meaningful limitation on taxpayers’ retained rights. In Lewis G.
Hutchens Non-Marital Trust v. Comm’r,92 the Service asserted a gift tax deficiency
against the decedent’s estate, on the grounds that the decedent had undervalued
certain transfers to his children of stock in the family business.93 The decedent and
his wife were majority shareholders of the business, who, the Service reasoned,
had the ability to control the dividends paid with respect to the stock; by failing to
declare dividends, the value of the stock increased.94 According to the Service, that
increase in value constituted an additional taxable gift to the decedent’s children.95
The Tax Court disagreed.96 In finding for the taxpayer the court held that the
decedent’s and his wife’s fiduciary duties as majority shareholders prohibited them
from promoting their personal interests over the corporation’s.97 Furthermore the
court found the decision not to declare dividends was in the interest of the

89

Id. at 978.
Id. at 979.
91
Id. (quoting Carrier v. Carrier, 123 N.E. 135 (N.Y. 1919)) (internal quotations
omitted). The court in King relied on Carrier v. Carrier, 123 N.E. 135 (N.Y. 1919), in
reaching its decision. Id.
92
66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1599 (1993).
93
See id. at 1617–18.
94
See id. at 1602–07, 1618–20.
95
See id. at 1625.
96
Id.
97
See id. at 1619 (citing United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 137-38 (1972), reh’g
denied, 409 U.S. 898 (1972).
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corporation because it allowed the company to retain working capital for other
needs.98
In Daniels v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,99 which was decided in
1994, the taxpayers moved for summary judgment in response to the Service’s
assertion of an alleged gift tax deficiency.100 As in Hutchens, the Service argued
that the failure to declare and pay corporate dividends constituted a taxable gift by
the taxpayers to their children, who were owners of the corporation’s common
stock.101 The Tax Court granted the taxpayers’ motion for summary judgment,
finding that the failure to declare and pay dividends did not constitute a gift to the
other stockholders.102 The court referred specifically to both Byrum and
Hutchens.103 Just as the Byrum and the Hutchens courts did, the Daniels court
recognized the vitality of fiduciary limitations imposed on the taxpayers as
members of the corporation’s board of directors.104 Furthermore, the Daniels court
added, the taxpayers had valid business reasons for the nonpayment of dividends,
so their actions were in the best interests of the corporation.105
2. The Continuing Vitality of Fiduciary Duty
In 1976 Congress responded to Byrum by passing an addition to I.R.C. §
2036106 that became I.R.C. § 2036(b) in 1978.107 Under that section, a transferor’s
estate includes the value of any shares of stock in a “controlled corporation” with
respect to which the transferor retained the right to vote those shares.108 The
retained right to vote the shares is deemed to be a retained right to enjoy the
property and therefore a trigger for estate tax inclusion.109 Under I.R.C. §
2036(b)(2), a controlled corporation is any corporation with respect to which,
during “the 3-year period ending on the date of the decedent’s death, the decedent
[or certain members of the decedent’s] family owned . . . , or had the right . . . to
98

See id. at 1618–20.
68 T.C.M. (CCH) 1310 (1994).
100
See id. at 1310.
101
See id. at 1313; see also Hutchens, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1618–20.
102
See Daniels, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1320.
103
See id. at 1319.
104
Id.
105
See id. at 1320.
106
Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §. 2009(a), 90 Stat. 1520. The
proposed legislation added one sentence to I.R.C. § 2036. Id.
107
Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 702(i), 92 Stat. 2763, 2931, reprinted
in 1978-3 C.B. (Vo. 1) 1, 165. This new section 2036(b) was effective with respect to
transfers made after June 22, 1976, the effective date of the 1976 legislation’s rule. Id. §
702(i)(3).
108
I.R.C. § 2036(b) (2006).
109
Id. § 2036(b)(1).
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vote. . . at least 20 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of [the
corporation's] stock.”110 Scholars and practitioners typically refer to this as the
“anti-Byrum” rule.111
At least one scholar has suggested that the language of I.R.C. § 2036(b) “does
not impact the Supreme Court's analysis of fiduciary duty as set forth in Byrum.”112
Although literally true, the House Committee explained that, “[T]he voting rights
are so significant with respect to corporate stock that the retention of voting rights
by a donor should be treated as the retention of the enjoyment of the stock” for
estate tax purposes.113 The committee added that such treatment “is necessary to
prevent the avoidance of the estate and gift taxes” and that “the capacity in which
the decedent exercised the voting rights is immaterial.”114
In one of the most significant fiduciary duty cases since Byrum, the United
States Tax Court ruled in Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue115
that the value of property transferred by a decedent during his lifetime to a family
limited partnership was includible in the decedent’s gross estate under I.R.C.
§ 2036(a).116 In 1993 Mr. Strangi was diagnosed with a terminal illness.117 Shortly
thereafter, his son-in-law, acting as attorney-in-fact, assumed management of Mr.
Strangi’s affairs.118 Approximately two months before Mr. Strangi’s death, his
attorney-in-fact transferred more than $9 million of Mr. Strangi’s property,
consisting mostly of cash and marketable securities, as well as Mr. Strangi’s
personal residence, to a family limited partnership in return for a 99% limited
partnership interest.119 The general partner of the partnership was a corporation
110

Id. § 2036(b)(2). The family members whose ownership will be attributed to the
transferor/decedent for purposes of I.R.C. § 2036 (b) are the decedent’s spouse, children,
grandchildren, parents and certain partnerships, estates, trusts and corporations owned by
any of the foregoing. Id. § 318(a)(1)-(3).
111
Brant J. Hellwig, Revisiting Byrum, 23 VA. TAX REV. 275, 326 (2003).
112
Elaine Hightower Gagliardi, Economic Substance in the Context of the Federal
Estate and Gift Tax: The Internal Revenue Service Has It Wrong, 64 MONT. L. REV. 389,
409 n.86 (2003).
113
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1380, at 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3356, 3419.
114
Id.
115
115 T.C. 478 (2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002), and
remanded in part, to Estate of Strangi v. Comm’r., 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1330 (2003)
(“Strangi III”), aff’d, 417 F.3d 468, 2005-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
116
Id. at 487–88. For a complete analysis of the Strangi case, see Mitchell M. Gans &
Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Strangi: A Critical Analysis and Planning Suggestions, 100 TAX
NOTES 1153 (2003).
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Strangi, 115 T.C. at 480.
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Id.
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Id. at 480–81.
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whose stock was owned 47% by Mr. Strangi and 53% by Mr. Strangi’s four
children.120 Mr. Strangi's attorney-in-fact was employed as the corporation’s
president.121 The assets transferred to the partnership represented approximately
98% of Mr. Strangi’s total wealth.122 Prior to Mr. Strangi’s death, the family
limited partnership paid for a variety of Mr. Strangi’s personal expenses, which
included his home health care.123
The Service asserted a deficiency against Mr. Strangi’s estate, alleging estate
tax inclusion of the value of the limited partnership interests under I.R.C.
2036(a)(1) because Mr. Strangi retained the right to enjoyment of the property.124
The Service also asserted estate tax inclusion under I.R.C. § 2036(s)(2) on the
grounds that Mr. Strangi retained the right to designate enjoyment of the
transferred property.125 The tax court ruled in favor of the Service on both
claims.126
The tax court first reasoned that the limited partnership interests were
included in Mr. Strangi's gross estate because he impliedly retained “economic
benefit” from the partnership.127 The court cited the fact that Mr. Strangi
transferred 98% of his wealth to the limited partnership, that he remained in his
personal residence after transferring it to the partnership, and that distributions
from the partnership had been made for Mr. Strangi's personal expenses.128
The tax court next reasoned that Mr. Strangi, in his capacity as a member of
the Board of Directors of the corporate general partner, effectively retained the
right to designate the enjoyment of the partnership property because he could join
with the other directors to direct or withhold distributions from the partnership.129
In other words, because of the managerial authority granted to the corporate
general partner, the Tax Court found that the “decedent can act together with other
[corporate] shareholders essentially to revoke the [limited partnership
arrangement] and thereby to bring about or accelerate present enjoyment of the
partnership assets.”130
In response to the estate’s assertion that a corporate shareholder’s fiduciary
duty would prevent him from joining with the other directors to revoke the
partnership agreement, the tax court distinguished the Strangi facts from Byrum.131
120
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The tax court noted that in Byrum, an “independent trustee . . . alone had the ability
to determine distributions from the disputed trust, notwithstanding any prior action
by corporate owners or directors.”132 Furthermore, the court stated that the “dual
roles” played by Mr. Strangi’s attorney-in-fact, as corporate manager and attorneyin-fact for one of the shareholders, compromised any fiduciary duty.133 Unlike in
Byrum, the alleged fiduciary duties in the Strangi case were substantively limited,
insofar as the fiduciary did not owe duties to “a significant number of unrelated
parties” and the asserted duties had no origin in “operating businesses that would
lend meaning to the standard of acting in the best interests of the entity.”134 The
court stated that “[t]he rights to designate [the transferred property] traceable to
decedent through [the corporate general partner] cannot be characterized as limited
in any meaningful way by duties owed essentially to himself. . . . Intrafamily
fiduciary duties within an investment vehicle are not equivalent in nature to the
obligations created” in Byrum.135
It is important to note that in Strangi, the tax court, affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, acknowledged that fiduciary duty may have some
meaning for estate tax purposes.136 But in Strangi, the tax court cited two facts as
precluding the finding that fiduciary duty was a meaningful limitation in that case.
First, any such duty would have run to Mr. Strangi himself as limited partner.137
Second, the limited partnership was an investment vehicle, not an operating
business.138 The court left open the possibility that, with different facts before it,
fiduciary duties might constitute meaningful limitations for estate tax purposes.139
The power of attorney presents the ideal scenario for the estate and gift tax
recognition of fiduciary duties. Such contracts for intimacy arise for largely nontax motives, such as planning for one’s subsequent incapacity140 and delegating
legal authority to another to engage in a particular transaction, as in Hypothetical 1
discussed in Part II B. Therefore, like in Byrum and unlike in Strangi, the duties of
an agent to a principal have legal and tax significance. The Uniform Power of
Attorney Act, passed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws on July 13, 2006 (the “2006 Act”)141 and discussed in the next part, is
consistent with this construction of the agent as the principal’s fiduciary.142
132
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IV. PROTECTING LEGAL AVATARS
A. Overview of the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act
The 2006 Act provides default rules applicable to powers of attorney and
recommends the use of a simple statutory form of power.143 The 2006 Act
improves on prior versions of uniform statutes concerning durable powers of
attorney, namely portions of the Uniform Probate Code of 1969144 and the Uniform
Durable Power of Attorney Act of 1979, as amended through 1987.145 As of the
late 1980s,146 some version of a uniform act had been adopted in a majority of
states, albeit with significant variations between and among them.147
In its survey of a national group of probate and elder law attorneys, the
National Conference of Commissioners found six main divergences among state
laws: “1) the authority of multiple agents; 2) the authority of a later-appointed
fiduciary or guardian; 3) the impact of dissolution or annulment of the principal’s
marriage to the agent; 4) activation of contingent powers; 5) the authority to make
gifts; and 6) standards for agent conduct and liability.”148 The survey revealed that
practitioners had substantial consensus about what constituted “best practices”
with respect to powers of attorney, such as whether the grant of a power should
include gift-giving authority (not unless the power expressly stated), what standard
of care an agent owes to the principal (a fiduciary duty), and what safeguards are
necessary to prevent abuse of the power of attorney (many).149
The 2006 Act regularizes the power of attorney in many ways. The
presumption of a power of attorney’s durability is one of the most important
also Press Release, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, New
Act Updates the Rules on Powers of Attorney (July 13, 2006), available at http://www.
nccusl.org/Update/DesktopModules/NewsDisplay.aspx?ItemID=159.
142
But see Boxx, supra note 4; Carolyn L. Dessin, Acting as Agent Under a Financial
Durable Power of Attorney: An Unscripted Role, 75 NEB. L. REV. 574 (1996).
143
See Uniform Power of Attorney Act Summary, supra note 12.
144
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-501–-505 (amended 1975), 8 U.L.A. 419–24
(1998).
145
See UNIF. DURABLE POWER OF ATT’Y ACT §§ 1–9 (amended 1987), 8A U.L.A.
246–59 (1998).
146
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws began its
study of professional opinion in 2002. Uniform Power of Attorney Act Summary, supra
note 12, at 1.
147
See UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT, supra note 1, at 22–23 (prefatory note); see also
William P. LaPiana, The New Uniform Power of Attorney Act, http://www.abanet.org/rppt/
publications/estate/2004/2/UPOAA-LaPiana.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
148
See UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT 22 (amended 2006), 8B U.L.A. 27 (Supp. 2007)
(prefatory note).
149
Id. at 22–23.
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changes.150 Previously the reverse assumption applied; silence meant that the
power terminated upon the principal’s incapacity. A principal was required to
specify if he or she wanted the agent’s authority to continue beyond the principal’s
incapacity or incompetence.151 Under the 2006 Act, a power is presumed to be
presently exercisable “unless the principal provides in the power of attorney that it
is to become effective at a future date or upon the occurrence of a future event or
contingency.”152 The 2006 Act provides a model statutory form of power of
attorney153 in an effort to regularize the substantive content of these instruments
and the procedures for their execution.154 The 2006 Act attempts to address “the
problem of persons that refuse to accept an agent’s authority.”155 Specifically
section 119 provides that a party who accepts a power of attorney in good faith
will be protected from liability as long as he or she has no actual knowledge that
the power of attorney has been revoked or terminated.156 Section 120 provides for
the imposition of financial and other penalties against a person who “unreasonably
refuses” to accept a power of attorney.157 A person’s refusal is not unreasonable if
he or she has actual knowledge of the revocation of the power of attorney158 or the
person has a reasonable belief that the offered power is invalid.159
In addition to rules designed to enhance the creation and use of powers of
attorney, the 2006 Act specifically addresses the six noted sources of divergence
among state laws.160 With respect to the authority of multiple agents, section 111
of the 2006 Uniform Act provides that “[u]nless the power of attorney otherwise
provides, each coagent may exercise its authority independently.”161 A successor
agent who survives the death or resignation of his or her co-agents may continue to
serve as sole agent.162 The principal also has the ability to nominate successor
agents who will have the same of authorities as the original agent.163 The powers
150

Id. § 104.
Id.
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Id. § 109(a).
153
Id. §§ 301–302 (Article 3).
154
The form power of attorney contemplates that the principal will initial the powers
that he or she wishes to grant to the agent. See id.
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Id. at 23 (prefatory note).
156
Id. § 119(b)–(c).
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Id. § 120(b)(5).
160
See supra note 156, at 125 and accompanying text.
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granted to an agent either may be enumerated or a principal may incorporate them
by reference to the 2006 Act.164
The 2006 Act clarifies the circumstances under which an agent’s authorities
commence and terminate. Under section 109, a power becomes effective
immediately upon execution165 and its durability shall continue unless it expressly
provides that the power terminates upon the incapacity of the principal.166 An
agent’s authority predictably terminates upon the principal’s death,167 revocation
by the principal,168 or termination pursuant to the terms of the instrument itself.169
An agent’s authority also will terminate if “an action is filed for the [dissolution] or
annulment of the agent’s marriage to the principal or their legal separation, unless
the power of attorney otherwise provides.”170 Unless one of those circumstances
exists, mere lapse of time does not cause the power to expire. The length of time
between the date of the execution of the power and the agent’s exercise of his or
her authority has no relevance.171 A power of attorney does not become “stale” by
virtue of the passage of time alone.172
The principal expressly must grant (or restrict) certain of an agent’s powers.173
For example, in order to avoid negative tax consequences for an agent who is an
ancestor, spouse, or a descendent of the principal, or a person whom the principal
is legally obligated to support, that agent shall not have the right to transfer to
himself or herself any interest in the principal’s property, “whether by gift, right of
survivorship, beneficiary designation, disclaimer, or otherwise.”174 Similarly, for
an agent to have the ability to create trusts, make gifts or create property rights in
others, the principal must expressly authorize the agent to do so.175 Otherwise the
2006 Act provides that the execution of a power of attorney grants broad
authorities to an agent with respect to the principal’s real property;176 tangible
personal property;177 stocks and bonds;178 commodities and options;179 banking and
164
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Id. §109(a).
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Id. § 205.
178
Id. § 206.
179
Id. § 207.
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other financial transactions;180 operation of an entity or business;181 insurance and
annuities;182 estates, trusts, and other beneficial interests;183 claims and litigation;184
personal and family maintenance;185 benefits from governmental programs;186
retirement plans;187 and taxes.188 A principal may incorporate all of those powers
by reference to grant an agent a wide range of authorities.189
For tax purposes, the Service takes the position that gifts made under a power
of attorney are revocable by the principal.190 Whether an agent under a power of
attorney has the ability to make gifts of the principal’s property has been the source
of significant litigation.191 Some courts have found that a broad grant of authority
includes the ability of the agent to make gifts,192 but other precedent suggests that
gift-giving authority must be granted specifically.193 Therefore the best practice is
for a principal to state specifically whether the agent may make gifts of the
principal’s property.194
If an agent has the ability to make gifts, whether as a matter of state law or
under the terms of the durable power of attorney, some courts (and the Service)
take the view that the agent has no ability to make such gifts to himself or
herself.195 The 2006 Act attempts to “strike[] a balance between the need for
180

Id. at § 208.
Id. at § 209.
182
Id. § 210.
183
Id. at § 211.
184
Id. at § 212.
185
Id. § 213.
186
Id. § 214.
187
Id. § 215.
188
Id. § 216.
189
Id. § 203.
190
Estate of Casey v. Comm’r, 948 F.2d 895, 896 (4th Cir. 1991).
191
In the absence of a specific grant of a gift-giving authority, courts often turn to
state law for a determination of whether silence in a power of attorney includes the ability
to make gifts. See, e.g., Estate of Ridenour v. Comm’r, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 1850, 1850-51
(1993) (applying Virginia law to gifts made by attorney-in-fact).
192
See id.
193
See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 950934 (Dec. 4, 1995) (stating that a power of
attorney must expressly grant gift-giving authority to agent). But see Ridenour, 65 T.C.M.
at *8 (holding that attorney-in-fact had power to grant gifts “in accordance with decedent’s
personal lifetime gift-giving history” under Virginia law).
194
See MYRON KOVE & JAMES M. KOSAKOW, 1 HANDLING FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFT
TAXES § 2:160 (6th ed. 2008) (“The power of attorney should be durable so that it survives
the principal’s incompetency, and should contain a specific power authorizing gifts to
family members”).
195
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 314 (1958).
181
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flexibility and acceptance of an agent’s authority and the need to prevent . . .
abuse.”196 Section 217 contains three significant provisions that apply to an agent
who has been granted a broad gift-giving authority. First, the agent may make an
unlimited number of annual exclusion gifts, so long as the value of each gift does
not exceed the per-donee limit established by I.R.C. § 2503(b)(1).197 Second, those
gifts may be made outright or in trust or to a college tuition savings program under
I.R.C. § 529.198 Finally, all gifts by an agent must be “consistent with the
principal’s objectives if actually known by the agent and, if unknown, as the agent
determines is consistent with the principal’s best interest based on all relevant
factors.”199 Therefore the 2006 Act creates boundaries that limit the power of an
agent who is generally authorized by a power of attorney to make gifts.200 In all
cases an agent is required to act consistently with the principal’s known objectives
or best interests.201 In other parts of the 2006 Act, this standard for decision
making is more fully articulated as a fiduciary duty, as discussed in the next
section.
B. Agents as Fiduciaries Under the Durable Power of Attorney Act
Generally speaking, fiduciary duty arises out of the constellation of the
“duties of loyalty, prudence, and a host of subsidiary rules that reinforce the duties
of loyalty and prudence.”202 In 1927, Justice Benjamin Cardozo, Chief Judge of the
New York Court of Appeals, famously described fiduciary duty as a standard
“stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio
of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.”203 A fiduciary is a
person with responsibilities to others and whose behavior is held to the highest
standard.
Consider a trustee of a lifetime or a testamentary trust. The trustee’s duty of
loyalty requires the trustee to administer the trust assets for the benefit of the
196

UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT 2 (amended 2006), 8B U.L.A. 27 (Supp. 2007)
(prefatory note).
197
Id. § 217(b)(1). The provision for excluding gifts from taxable income is set forth
at I.R.C. § 2503(b)(1) (2000). Originally the exclusion amount was $10,000 but was
adjusted to $12,000 beginning in the 2006 tax year. See Rev. Proc. 2005-70, 2005-2 C.B.
979, 984.
198
See UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 217(a).
199
Id. § 217(a).
200
See id. § 217. Note however that a power of attorney can provide the agent with
greater powers. Id. § 217(b) (stating that the boundaries of the act apply “[u]nless the
power of attorney otherwise provides”).
201
Id. § 217(c).
202
JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 772 (7th ed. 2005)
(emphasis omitted).
203
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
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beneficiaries alone.204 Without court approval, the trustee may not buy trust assets
or sell them to himself, borrow trust funds, loan funds to the trust, profit (except
through compensation) from serving as trustee, commingle the trustee’s and trust
assets, or indirectly engage in any of the foregoing.205 Similarly the duty of
prudence206 requires a trustee to act in accordance with “the standards in dealing
with the trust assets that would be observed by a prudent man dealing with the
property of another.”207
The 2006 Act imposes most of the traditional duties of a fiduciary (such as
trustee) on an agent acting under a power of attorney.208 Section 114(b) of the 2006
Act enumerates nine specific duties,209 each of which can be characterized as a
duty of loyalty, a duty of prudence, or a derivative thereof. First in the list is the
agent’s duty to act “loyally for the principal’s benefit.”210 The agent must act
within the scope of the authority granted to him or her211 and in a manner that is
“in accordance with the principal’s reasonable expectations,” if known, or if not,
then in the principal’s “best interest.”212 The agent may not create a conflict of
interest that would prevent the agent from acting in the principal’s best interest.213
The agent must cooperate with any person named as the principal’s agent for
health-care decision making.214
The agent’s duty of prudence is articulated as the duty to “act with the care,
competence, and diligence ordinarily exercised by agents in similar
circumstances.”215 Interestingly, although the 2006 Act refers to the behavior of
“agents in similar circumstances” as the touchstone against which an agent will be
measured, this standard falls somewhat short of the traditional articulation of the
204

See In re Gleeson’s Will, 124 N.E.2d 624, 627 (Ill. App. Ct. 1955) (describing
how trustee’s lease of trust land to himself constituted a breach of fiduciary duty); Hartman
v. Hartle, 122 A. 615, 615 (N.J. Ch. 1923) (describing how trustee breached fiduciary duty
when he purchased estate property in wife’s name).
205
GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 543(rev. 2d ed.
1993 & Supp. 2007).
206
See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 804 (2005).
207
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 7-302 (1993).
208
See generally UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114 (amended 2006), 8B U.L.A.
27 (Supp. 2007) (detailing the fiduciary duties of an agent notwithstanding the provision in
the power of attorney).
209
Id. §114(a), (b).
210
Id. § 114(b)(1).
211
Id. § 114(a)(3).
212
Id. § 114(a)(1).
213
Id. § 114(b)(2).
214
Id. § 114(b)(5).
215
Id. § 114(b)(3).
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duty of prudence—that is, “the standards in dealing with [property] that would be
observed by a prudent man dealing with the property of another.”216 Therefore
agents under powers of attorney are compared with other agents, not necessarily
the prudent person, although one hopes that the average agent is prudent. If not, the
average agent’s behavior remains the measurement under the 2006 Act. An agent
is required, as part of the duty of prudence, to “attempt to preserve the principal’s
estate plan,” if both known by the agent and “consistent with the principal’s best
interest.”217 The agent must keep complete records of his or her actions.218
Even though the 2006 Act embraces the duties of loyalty, prudence and their
derivatives, the 2006 Act also specifically permits the agent to engage in limited
self-dealing transactions. An agent under a power of attorney may benefit from a
transaction with the principal as long as the agent acts with “care, competence, and
diligence for the best interests of the principal.”219 Evaluation of the agent’s “care,
competence, and diligence” necessarily will take into account the agent’s
individual skills and expertise.220 To the extent that an agent is permitted to self
deal without court approval at all suggests that the duties of an agent under a
durable power of attorney are somewhat less rigorous than a trustee’s duties to
trust beneficiaries, for example.221
From a policy perspective, the somewhat modified fiduciary duty of an agent
to a principal under a power of attorney reflects at least in part the uniqueness of
the principal-agent relationship. In many cases, the person acting as agent will be a
natural object of the principal’s bounty. A family member may be chosen as agent,
for example, precisely because the principal has a close relationship with him or
her. That close relationship, combined with the competent principal’s ability to
revoke the power of attorney, functions as some protection against an agent’s
acting in a manner that is inconsistent with the principal’s directions or best
interests. In the trustee-beneficiary scenario, trust beneficiaries typically have no
ability to remove the trustee.222 Also the trust’s grantor, not the beneficiaries,
selects the initial trustee, who may be a stranger to the beneficiaries. And even if
the initial trustee were a person or institution known to the initial trust
beneficiaries, as more time passes, it is less likely that a successor trustee and trust
beneficiaries have any personal relationship.
216

See supra note 207.
UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 114(b)(6).
218
Id. § 114(b)(4).
219
Id. § 114(d).
220
Id. § 114(e).
221
See, e.g., In re Estate of Hegel, 668 N.E.2d 474, 478 (Ohio 1996) (stating that
courts are not required to approve acts of agent under power of attorney); see also supra
notes 72–74 and accompanying text (describing fiduciary duties).
222
But see Stewart E. Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency Costs, and Fiduciary Duty, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2761 (2006) (discussing the use of trust protectors to enforce principals’
intent).
217
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C. Fiduciary Duties Are Meaningful Limitations for Tax Purposes
Fiduciary duty is the most commonly asserted explanation for why the
creation of a durable power of attorney does not give rise to negative wealth
transfer tax consequences.223 Even under a law such as the 2006 Act, which grants
an agent the ability to appoint the principal’s property to himself or herself,224 the
agent’s power is limited to the annual exclusion amount.225 The agent is
constrained by his or her duty of loyalty to the principal from applying the trust
property in a manner that is inconsistent with the best interests of the principal.226
An agent under a power of attorney has a slightly different fiduciary duty from a
trustee. That difference arises out of the unique nature of the principal-agent
relationship.
Fiduciary duty in the power of attorney context has an estate and gift tax
impact that it does not have in other contexts.227 At its core, a power of attorney is
a contract for intimacy. More people have created these contracts for intimacy than
have established a trust.228 According to one survey of adults age 50 and over, 23%
of that population have created one or more lifetime trusts,229 but 45% have
executed a durable power of attorney.230 Among the age 75 to 79 subgroup, about
30% have created a trust231 but 60% have executed a durable power of attorney.232
Contracts for legal intimacy of the principal-agent variety are popular because
they are easy to create without a lawyer. In fact, the power of attorney forms that
are available in stationery stores and on the internet233 are often identical to those
223

See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.C.
225
See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
226
See supra Part IV.B.
227
See supra Part III.
228
AARP Research Group, Where There is a Will...: Legal Documents Among the
50+ Population: Findings from an AARP Survey (Apr. 2000), http://assets.aarp.org/
rgcenter/econ/will.pdf.
229
Id. at 5.
230
Id.
231
Id. at fig.7.
232
Id. Other commentators estimate that approximately 70 percent of people over the
age of seventy have executed powers of attorney. MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 10, at
300 (citing Thomas J. Begley, Jr. & Andrew H. Hook, The Elder Law Durable Power of
Attorney, 29 EST. PLAN. 538 (2002)).
233
See, e.g., Statutory Durable Power of Attorney Form (listing a variety of powers
which may be denied by crossing them out), available at http://www.texasprobate.com/
forms/poa.htm (last visited July 2, 2008).
224
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used by expensive law firms.234 Additionally, power of attorney forms, unlike
many will and trust forms, require minimal customization. Therefore it is likely
that a layperson can prepare and execute a power of attorney form without making
legally significant mistakes; problems with will and trust forms, in contrast, give
rise to well-known litigation.235
Durable powers of attorney are also appealing because they enable a principal
to share or delegate power over his or her property without relinquishing full
control over it. For those who are reluctant to acknowledge that they have lost the
interest, ability, or energy to manage their property, the power of attorney may be a
particularly desirable arrangement. Unlike a court-appointed guardianship, a
contract for intimacy is a private arrangement that need be known only to the
principal, agent, and the person requested to accept the durable power of attorney
as evidence of the agent’s authority. The contract for intimacy allows for a level of
privacy that a guardianship does not.
V. THE FUTURE OF LEGAL AVATARS
A. For Taxpayers with Limited Traditional Family Ties
The 2006 Act standardizes the contract for legal intimacy that arises between
a principal and agent under a durable power of attorney.236 The 2006 Act clearly
defines the agent’s duties to the principal. From a business perspective, one can
anticipate a shift in the practices of certain banks and trust companies. Just as some
institutions now offer professional executor or trustee services, these institutions
could expand their fiduciary business to include professional attorney-in-fact
services. This potential shift to a commodified, professional fiduciary relationship
would have no impact on the very rich (who can pay a bank or trust company to
act in this capacity) or the very poor (who will not be able to afford professional
fiduciary services at any cost). The United States middle class, however, may
benefit from being able to obtain professional fiduciary services at a standardized
rate.
Many Americans live more than two hours from their closest family
members. These people would be the target market for professional fiduciary
services under a power of attorney. Even those who do live close to family
members may prefer a professional fiduciary; not everyone has a trusted family
member who is willing and able to take care of his or her financial and personal
matters. The divorce rate for first marriages hovered at 3.6 per 1,000 of the
234

See supra note 6.
See, e.g., In re Estate of Mulkins, 496 P.2d 605, 607 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972)
(holding that the text of the will form itself was “surplusage,” but that the remainder
formed a valid holographic will).
236
See supra Part IV.A.
235
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population in 2005.237 Marriage rates occur at a rate of 7.5 per 1,000 of the total
population.238 Of the 105.5 million households surveyed in the 2000 Census,
68.1% were “family households” (households containing at least one person
related to the head of household by birth, marriage or adoption).239 31.9% were
“non-family households” (not containing at least one person related to the head of
the household by birth marriage or adoption).240 More and more often people live
far away from family members; they live alone or with others to whom they are
bound together by affective ties, but not genetic or legal ones.
B. For Taxpayers of Varying Levels of Wealth
The regularization of the principal-agent relationship by the 2006 Act may
lead to its commodification. If so, then those who do not have a family member or
close associate willing or able to fulfill that function will be able to engage a
professional to do so at presumably competitive prices. Four factors would
encourage positive performances by a professional agent at a relatively low cost.
First, there are very low barriers to entry. One need not have specialized training or
knowledge to act as an agent under a power of attorney. Second, a professional
fiduciary will want to maintain a good reputation in the community, or risk losing
existing business. Third, a professional fiduciary will want to enhance his, her or
its good reputation in the community in order to increase business. If a professional
fiduciary abuses his, her or its authority under a power of attorney, the fiduciary
will have difficulty maintaining existing business and attracting new business.
Fourth, a professional fiduciary has an incentive to act within the scope of its
authority because it will be a repeat player who both proffers and receives powers
of attorney in the financial marketplace.

237

BIRTH, MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, AND DEATHS: PROVISIONAL DATA FOR 2005,
NAT’L. VITAL STATISTICS REPORT 54 (2) (July 21, 2006), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/
nvsr/nvsr54/nvsr54_20.pdf.
238
Id.
239
Tavia Simmons and Grace O’Neill, Households and Families: 2000 Census Brief
(Sept. 2001), Table 1, http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-8.pdf.
240
Id.
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To illustrate, consider two neighborhood banks, Bank X and Bank Y, both of
which offer professional services as agents under powers of attorney. Bank X will
want to act within the scope of its authority under a power of attorney presented to
Bank Y, for example, because Bank X will want Bank Y to act similarly with
respect to any power of attorney presented to Bank X. Furthermore, if Bank X
imposes significant transaction costs (such as delay) every time Bank Y presents a
power of attorney, then Bank Y will impose significant transaction costs every
time Bank X presents a power of attorney. Neither would be able to carry out its
duties in a timely fashion. Market incentives would encourage the two banks to act
appropriately.
As a practical matter, however, professional fiduciaries may not appeal even
to taxpayers who can afford them. A professional might do a “better” job as agent
than would a friend or family member, but a professional fiduciary might feel less
obligated to act in conformity with a principal’s previously expressed wishes or
unique needs. Acting as agent will be cost ineffective for the professional fiduciary
if too much customized work is required. One hopes that an individual nominated
as agent would feel at least some moral duty to act consistently with the principal’s
wishes, no matter how idiosyncratic, because of his or her personal connection to
the principal. An institutional relationship by its nature is less likely to carry with it
such a moral or behavioral obligation.
If a professional fiduciary business does develop in response to the Act, most
taxpayers will remain in the same position in which they were before the Act.
Wealthy people, who have always had the ability to hire a professional fiduciary,
will continue to be able to afford one. They may even benefit from cost reductions
due to the regularization of the principal-agent relationship. Of course a person
may not need to engage a professional fiduciary, if a willing child, for example,
will perform those services.
In contrast, moderate-income or low-income taxpayers who historically have
not employed professional fiduciaries may still not be able to afford them,
regardless of how low the fees become. Even a commodified principal-agent
relationship may be too costly for many taxpayers; the Act does nothing to help
these taxpayers contract for intimacy. Yet the regularization of these types of
contracts suggests the possible recognition of other choice-based human
relationships, discussed in the next part.
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VI. TAX AVATARS, ALTER EGOS AND CHOICE-BASED RELATIONSHIPS
A. How Legal Avatars Benefit the Economy
Critical scholars who share an anti-subordination agenda have two reasons to
engage in a deep analysis of the tax treatment of powers of attorney. First, if the
tax and other aspects of powers of attorney are well understood, the value of an
agent’s services will be able to be measured accurately. Second, a regularized
principal-agent relationship should be understood in historical context; it conforms
to the cultural practice of outsourcing activities that one is not willing or able to do
for oneself (or find a family member to do).
Commodification of the fiduciary relationship under a power of attorney will
permit scholars to measure more accurately the economic value of this work.241
The overwhelming majority of caregivers for the elderly are female.242 In a study
of elderly people’s choice of a health care proxy, i.e., someone to make medical
decisions in the event of the individual’s incapacity, “in selecting a surrogate
decision maker, elders tend to look at those they see as caregivers. The spouses of
elderly persons are commonly elderly as well and therefore may have physical or
cognitive deficits that limit their ability to engage in effective caregiving.”243
Therefore if women are most likely to be caretakers, and caretakers are likely to be
the surrogate decision makers, it is not unreasonable to assume that women are
more likely than men to serve as agents under a power of attorney.
For feminist legal scholars in particular, making women’s caretaking work
visible historically has been an important project.244 For example, Martha Fineman
has highlighted the secondary economic effects of women’s caretaking activities.
Fineman points to women’s “derivative dependency”: “[T]hose who care for others
241

In the international development context, Lourdes Benería has suggested that
much of women’s work is not accounted for in economic studies because it is unregulated
or not generally visible in the marketplace. See LOURDES BENERÍA, GENDER,
DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBILIZATION: ECONOMICS AS IF ALL PEOPLE MATTERED 136 (2003)
(describing the role of women in the informal sector and the difficulty of gathering
systemic information from this informal sector).
242
For a breakdown of the demographics of formal and informal caregivers, see
Jeannette Takamura & Bob Williams, Informal Caregiving: Compassion in Action 5–12,
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/carebro2.pdf (last visited July 2, 2008).
243
Nina A. Kohn, Elder Empowerment As a Strategy for Curbing the Abuse of
Durable Powers of Attorney, 59 RUTGERS L.REV. 1, 9 (2006).
244
See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 9 (1995) (framing her argument in
terms of “burden[ing] those who would caretake with ideological and actual impediments
that make their tasks more difficult”).
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are themselves dependent on resources in order to undertake that care. Caretakers
have a need for monetary or material resources. They also need recourse to
institutional supports and accommodation, a need for structural arrangements that
facilitate caretaking.”245 In a similar vein, Katharine Silbaugh has emphasized the
importance of understanding the economic value of women’s unpaid caretaking
and household work.246 She says, “[h]ome labor as an area of significant concern to
women’s working lives does not appear to be temporary. . . . [I]t is critical to push
for the equality of treatment of that work with paid work, and not just to seek the
equality of treatment of both men and women in the paid labor force.”247 A crucial
step toward gender equality, then, is measuring the economic value of women’s
unpaid work. If even a small professional fiduciary service business arises from the
regularized principal-agent relationship created under the 2006 Act, then the
market itself will set the value for this “caretaking” work.
If it is true that more women than men do the caretaking work of agents under
a power of attorney, then the shift to a market in professional fiduciaries mirrors
other cultural practices of outsourcing work traditionally performed by women.
The influx of women into paid “market” work created a secondary workforce of
women engaged in paid child-care and housekeeping. Some scholars have
suggested that women’s work outside the home has perpetuated a hierarchy in
which “market” (outside-the-home) work is more important than “non-market”
(inside-the-home) work, even if both are compensated.248 Additionally, critics
claim that women’s paid employment outside the home reifies a racialized
economic stratification of women in which (the typically white) women who work
outside the home employ women (typically of color) to work inside the (typically
white) women’s homes.249 Yet in the power of attorney context, the shift of one
woman’s responsibilities onto another is not likely to involve outsourcing to a
party with a lesser bargaining position. A professional fiduciary, such as a bank or
trust company, will be able to charge a market rate for its services and will offer
245

Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence,
Autonomy and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13, 20 (1999).
246
Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women’s Household Labor, 9 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 81 (1997).
247
Id. at 101.
248
MARY ROMERO, MAID IN THE U.S.A. 98 (1992) (“[e]mployed middle- and uppermiddle class women escaped the double day syndrome by hiring poor women of color to
perform housework and child care, and this was characterized as progress. Some feminists
defined domestic service as progress . . . . However this definition neglects the inescapable
fact that when women hire other women at low wages to do housework, both employees
and employers remain women”).
249
Rosa Lopez, Christopher Darden and Me, in CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A
READER (Adrien Katharine Wing ed., 2d ed. 2003); Taunya Lovel Banks, Toward a Global
Critical Feminsit Vision: Domestic Wor, and the Nanny Tax Debate, 3 J. Gender, Race &
Justice 1, 31 nn. 139–40 (1999).
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professional agent services only if they are remunerative. In contrast, at least with
childcare and housekeeping, the women to whom the work is “outsourced” often
earn minimum wage and have limited economic mobility.250 In this way, the
projected outsourcing of professional agent work avoids some of the traditional
critiques of other outsourcing of women’s work.
B. How Legal Avatars Benefit Diverse Human Relationships
Another reason that scholars need to understand the tax treatment of powers
of attorney is that the Service’s recognition of contractual intimacy in this context
may suggest the possibility of formal recognition in the tax law of other
relationships that arise by individual choice. Affective family-like relationships
have achieved some level of legal recognition in other, more fundamental areas of
the law. For example, in response to a decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court
in 2006,251 the New Jersey state legislature passed “An Act Concerning Marriage
and Civil Unions” granting to same-sex partners to a civil union “all the rights and
benefits that married heterosexual couples enjoy.”252 But the vast majority of
opposite-sex New Jersey couples must marry in order to receive these rights and
benefits.253 As a policy matter, New Jersey law gives its imprimatur to certain
relationships through formal labels of “marriage” and “civil union.”254
In contrast to the New Jersey rule, the Netherlands has a rule that permits any
two people to choose to be treated as “married,” but for the limited purposes of tax
reporting and paying:
These partners are permitted to share joint income (e.g., their
taxable income from an owner-occupied dwelling, splitting mortgage
interest deduction, child care expenses, taxable income from substantial
participation, and the personal allowance) between them for their tax
return. Of course, the law demands some conditions to be fulfilled . . . .
250

This may be due to language status, educational status, economic status or a
variety of other factors. See, e.g., id.
251
Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 206 (N.J. 2006) (holding that same-sex couples
have no fundamental or constitutional right to be married under New Jersey law; they do
have a right to the “benefits and privileges afforded to married heterosexual couples”).
252
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-28 (West Supp. 2008).
253
See Domestic Partnership Act, N.J . STAT. ANN. § 26:8A (West 2007 & Supp.
2008). New Jersey makes an exception for opposite sex couples, where both of the parties
are age 62 or older. See id. § 26:8A4(b)(5). These couples can register their domestic
partnership and receive certain state benefits. See id. §26:8A.
254
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-1 (West 2007) (prohibiting certain marriages or civil
unions).
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The most important conditions are having a joint household and having
lived together for at least six months. . . . [S]ame-sex (homosexual)
couples[,] . . . a parent and an adult child or . . . other siblings or nonsiblings who share one household . . . can opt to be partners for tax
purposes.255
By permitting these types of elective “family” registrations, the Netherlands
consciously recognizes and grants privileges to those relationships that have
certain qualities of most marriages (a physically shared residence and some
economic pooling). Dutch law gives greater latitude, at least in a tax sense, to
many types of relationships that arise by choice, not just those relationships that
are eligible for official state recognition as “marriage” or a “civil union,” which
labels depend on the gender of the parties and the presumed existence of a sexual
relation between them.
Like the New Jersey law and unlike the Dutch law, the U.S. federal laws of
wealth transfer taxation generally are selective in what types of relationships
between taxpayers are eligible for favorable treatment.256 For example, a taxpayer
may make unlimited tax-free transfers to his or her U.S. citizen-spouse.257 Some
death-time transfers to family members receive favorable estate tax treatment
compared to transfers of the same property to non-family members.258 The estate
and gift tax treatment of the power of attorney is an important exception to the
preferential treatment for married, heterosexual couples and certain family
members. The fact that creating a power of attorney triggers no taxable gift by the
principal or estate tax inclusion for the agent259 is true regardless of the presence or
absence of a genetic or other legal relationship between the principal and agent.260
Thus, at least in the power of attorney context, the U.S. federal estate and gift tax
laws permit the recognition of all intimate relationships that arise by contract.
255
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distribution of certain types of real property to family members may affect the property’s
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The law’s recognition of contracts can be the source of power and rights for
members of disenfranchised groups. Consider, for example, Professor Patricia
Williams’ description of her apartment search and how it differed from her white
male colleague’s search:
In my rush to show good faith and trustworthiness, I signed a
detailed, lengthily negotiated, finely printed lease firmly establishing me
as the ideal arm’s-length transactor . . . . [Peter and I] could not reconcile
our very different relations to the tonalities of law. Peter, for example,
appeared to be extremely self-conscious of his power potential (either
real or imagistic) as white or male or lawyer authority figure. He seemed
to go some lengths to overcome the wall that image might impose . . . .
On the other hand, I was raised to be acutely conscious of the likelihood
that no matter what degree of professional I am, people will greet and
dismiss my black femaleness as unreliable, untrustworthy, hostile, angry,
powerless, irrational and probably destitute . . . . [T]o show that I can
speak the language of lease is my way of enhancing trust of me in my
business affairs.261
For Williams, a contract evidences legal personhood and secures rights. Only
those in positions of power (the “white or male or lawyer authority figure”) eschew
the contract. But those whom society has regarded as “unreliable, untrustworthy,
hostile” or otherwise outsiders are the ones who can benefit most from the
formalized rights and recognition inherent in a contract. Favorable estate and gift
tax treatment of contractual intimacy then can read as recognition of the rights (and
responsibilities) that the parties to the contract have. For those with relationships
that are already favored, because of marital status or otherwise, the
commodification of the principal-agent relationship may have no cultural
significance. But for members of out-groups, legal recognition and protection for
their relationships are crucial steps toward meaningful rights.
If the wealth transfer tax laws give a favorable tax treatment to contracts for
intimacy that arise under a power of attorney, then the law has the capacity to
recognize elective, non-marital relationships for other tax purposes. The
Netherlands example suggests that any two people should be able to “opt in” to
being treated as a single taxpaying unit. Such an “opt in” to favorable tax treatment
currently exists with respect to powers of attorney.262 Just as one can enter into a
contract for intimacy in the form of a power of attorney, an individual taxpayer
should be able to designate another as his or her “partner” for income tax filing
261
262

PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 147 (1991).
See supra Part III.B.
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purposes. That same “partner” could receive lifetime and death-time transfers free
of any wealth transfer tax, just as spouses can.263 Also the tax-designated “partner”
could be treated as a “member of the family” of the taxpayer for purposes of
eligibility for the special valuation rules under I.R.C. § 2032A among other tax
benefits.264
These are only two illustrations of the ways that the tax law could recognize
tax-designated partners. As with any benefits, a person with a tax-designated
partner would be required to accept the negative consequences of that designation.
For example, that tax-designated partner would be considered as a “member of the
family” of the taxpayer within the meaning of I.R.C. § 318265 for purposes of
determining whether a particular corporation is a “controlled corporation” within
the meaning of I.R.C. § 2036(b).266 A full exploration of all of the possibilities for
the tax recognition of contractual intimacy deserves more in-depth study, which is
beyond the scope of this article. The next section outlines the theoretical
implications for future critical scholarship of tax recognition of contracts for
intimacy.
C. How Legal Avatars Impact Tax Scholarship
1. An Overview of Critical Tax Scholarship
The mid- to late-1990s were the halcyon days of critical tax scholarship.
During this period, a small number of law professors attracted significant attention
for the application of so-called “outsider” perspectives to the study of the Internal
Revenue Code.267 Their scholarship employed feminist theory, critical race theory,
and LGBT perspectives to uncover bias against women, racial minorities, and gays
and lesbians.
Some of the best feminist-oriented tax scholarship had the quality of
intellectual archaeology. Carolyn Jones’s historical work highlighted women’s

263
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participation in nineteenth-century tax protests.268 Although Jones did not
specifically contextualize her scholarship, her study of women’s tax resistance
employed the classic feminist legal method of “emphasiz[ing] women’s
experience.”269 Similarly Wendy Gerzog read the specialized estate and gift tax
marital deduction rules from the perspective of women who survive their
spouses.270 Gerzog suggested that certain tax rules contribute to women’s
economic dependence and are based on traditional gender stereotypes of women.271
Her work demonstrated the feminist legal method of exposing “male bias and male
norms in rules, standards, and concepts that appear neutral or objective on their
face,” a classic method of feminist legal theory.272 Also in a similar vein, Nancy
Staudt undertook a study of the tax treatment of unpaid household work and
argued that the “the Tax Code provides financial incentives for women to work in
the home after bearing children. It is not surprising that the tax laws reflect an
image of men as public actors earning a wage in the market, and that the laws
assume women do not and should not have such roles.”273 By exposing the “lessthan-ideal course of action” that women face,274 Staudt employed feminist legal
methodology to understand better the disparate impact of seemingly facially
neutral rules.275
At approximately the same time that Jones’s, Gerzog’s, and Staudt’s work
appeared, three scholars in particular employed critical race theory as a lens for
examining the Internal Revenue Code. Beverly Moran, William Whitford and
Dorothy Brown responded explicitly to Professor Jerome Culp’s challenge that
268
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“[e]veryone has to do black scholarship if it is to succeed.”276 Moran and Whitford
in their 1996 article, “A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code,”277 declared
the relevance of critical race theory to tax scholarship:
One main thrust of critical race theory is a belief that racial
subordination is everywhere, a structural aspect of all parts of American
society. If this part of critical race theory has merit, then every important
American institution should reflect racial subordination, even such a
seemingly neutral institution as the American tax system.278
Similarly, Dorothy Brown has focused her research agenda on the purported
neutrality of tax laws.279 In a 1997 speech, Brown proposed a scholarly project
“dedicated to forever eradicating the belief that tax law is somehow different, that
it has no differing impact based upon race, ethnicity, or any other characteristic.”280
In one article, Brown exposed “how the convergence of the tax principles,
employment discrimination, and differing marital rates result in black couples
being more likely to pay a higher marriage penalty and white couples being more
likely to receive a marriage bonus.”281 In another article, Brown demonstrated how
members of some racial groups are more likely than members of other racial
groups to be eligible for certain tax credits.282 By combining sociological studies
with technical understanding of tax rules, Brown exposed the racialized aspects of
tax law.
Writing approximately five years after this highly publicized feminist and
critical race scholarship, Anthony Infanti added another critical perspective to the
study of tax law. Infanti’s work engages in illustrating that tax is just one of the
many areas of law that actively discriminate against lesbian and gay people.283 He
has applied critical theoretical methods to study tax expenditures and tax
treaties.284 According to Infanti, the tax law is “an area where gay and lesbian
276
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issues generally remain shrouded in darkness, forcibly banished to the invisibility
of the closet.”285 His scholarship invites consideration of how tax rules impact
individuals whose relationships are not recognized for federal tax purposes.286
The reaction of traditional tax scholars to feminist, critical race, and LGBT
perspectives has not been positive. Critical tax scholarship has been criticized as
inaccurate and unhelpful. Lawrence Zelenak suggests that critical scholarship
displays “an overeagerness to accuse the tax laws of hostility to women.”287 Both
Zelenak and Joseph Dodge have dismissed critical scholarship as failing to
articulate a positive agenda for legal reform.288 Their critique is accurate in part, to
the extent that critical tax scholarship does not take as its primary task a detailed
rewriting of tax rules, nor does it emphasize the ways in which the tax law actually
could favor disenfranchised groups.289 But to suggest that it should develop a
positive agenda fundamentally misunderstands the critical project as a whole.
Critical tax scholarship uncovers, reveals, and exposes bias in the face of
arguments that the tax laws are value neutral.
2. Opportunities for Critical Tax Scholarship
This article shares the normative assumptions of critical tax scholarship.290 It
accepts the proposition that the tax laws are biased in favor of certain groups.291 It
argues that the tax laws should recognize a wider range of human relationships
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than they currently do.292 Where this work departs from critical tax scholarship,
however, is in its methodology. Instead of centering the critique on ways in which
the existing tax rules are discriminatory (at worst) or misguided (at best), the
article focuses on how the current tax law suggests the possibility for broader
recognition of alternative family structures and choice-based human relationships.
Through a detailed analysis of the estate and gift tax treatment of powers of
attorney, one can see how the existing tax structure accommodates and privileges
contracts for intimacy. Similar choice-based relationships could receive favorable
treatment in other tax contexts.293 By focusing more on the positive aspects of
existing tax rules, critical tax scholars have the opportunity to use the current legal
framework to subvert restrictive and discriminatory social structures and to achieve
recognition and protection for those who experience discrimination or
disadvantage.
Writing about feminism in particular, Janet Halley has warned about the
constraining theoretical consequences of a movement’s failure to embrace its own
power.294 In particular, Halley suggests that feminism has taken on a tyrannical
quality; it wields “actual, real-world and theoretical power.”295 Halley calls powerwielding, moralistic feminism “governance feminism.”296 One of the main
theoretical missteps of governance feminism according to Halley is feminism’s
persistence in believing itself to be powerless:
[A]cknowledging [some feminist work] to be a governance project has a
dark side, and it is important to face it. That dark side includes its
vanquished, its prisoners of war, the interests that pay the taxes it has
levied and owe the rents it has imposed. Feminism with blood on its
hands. . . .
....
. . .[W]hen governance feminism/feminist theory pretends it is always the
underdog, and when feminists insist that the prodigals must be converged
back into feminism or feminism will die, it wages power without owning
it. . . .
....
. . . When feminist theory refuses to own its will to power, when it insists
that prodigals must be converged back into feminism, it commits itself to
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a theoretical stance that makes it hard for feminists to see around corners
of their own construction.297
One need not agree with Halley’s proposal to “take a break from feminism” to
appreciate her claim that feminist theory is constrained by negative perceptions of
feminists. Instead of pronouncing itself an “underdog” perspective, feminism
needs to acknowledge its power.298 So, too, should critical tax scholars be willing
to move away—at least temporarily—from a critical perspective. Some existing
tax rules, such as the wealth transfer tax rules applicable to powers of attorney,
work in favor of the larger project of creating a tax system that is free from bias of
any kind.
VII. CONCLUSION
As avatars stand for the internet’s end users, agents under a power of attorney
act on behalf of the appointing principal. Both an avatar and an agent under a
power of attorney are kinds of alter egos. The favorable wealth transfer tax
treatment that legal avatars receive suggests their utility as a model for how the tax
law could be expanded to recognize other choice-based relationships. In his novel
The Partners, author and lawyer Louis Auchincloss wrote that “[e]verything today
is taxes. . . . What better seat on the grandstand of life can I offer you than that of
tax counsel?”299 Understanding the tax treatment of legal avatars is the foundation
for a grandstand for seeing the potential diversity of preference-based relationships
that the law could embrace.
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